I’m from a fortunate generation. I can remember a time — about a quarter-century ago — when the world seemed to be coming together. The great Cold War contest between communism and capitalism appeared to be over. Democracy was still spreading. Nations were becoming more economically interdependent. The internet seemed ready to foster worldwide communications. It seemed as if there would be a global convergence around a set of universal values — freedom, equality, personal dignity, pluralism, human rights.
我来自幸运的一代。我记得有一次——大约 25 年前——世界似乎正在​​走到一起。共产主义与资本主义之间的冷战大战似乎已经结束。民主仍在蔓延。各国在经济上变得更加相互依存。互联网似乎已经准备好促进全球交流。似乎全球将围绕一套普世价值——自由、平等、个人尊严、多元化、人权——达成共识。

We called this process of convergence globalization. It was, first of all, an economic and a technological process — about growing trade and investment between nations and the spread of technologies that put, say, Wikipedia instantly at our fingertips. But globalization was also a political, social and moral process.
我们把这种融合过程称为全球化。首先，这是一个经济和技术过程——关于国家之间不断增长的贸易和投资以及技术的传播，例如，维基百科让我们立即触手可及。但全球化也是一个政治、社会和道德过程。

In the 1990s, the British sociologist Anthony Giddens argued that globalization is “a shift in our very life circumstances. It is the way we now live.” It involved “the intensification of worldwide social relations.” Globalization was about the integration of worldviews, products, ideas and culture.
1990 年代，英国社会学家安东尼·吉登斯 (Anthony Giddens) 认为，全球化是“我们生活环境的转变。这就是我们现在的生活方式。”它涉及“世界范围内社会关系的强化”。全球化是关于世界观、产品、思想和文化的整合。

This fit in with an academic theory that had been floating around called Modernization Theory. The idea was that as nations developed, they would become more like us in the West — the ones who had already modernized.
这与一种被称为现代化理论的学术理论相吻合。这个想法是，随着国家的发展，它们会变得更像西方的我们——那些已经现代化的国家。

In the wider public conversation, it was sometimes assumed that nations all around the world would admire the success of the Western democracies and seek to imitate us. It was sometimes assumed that as people “modernized,” they would become more bourgeois, consumerist, peaceful — just like us. It was sometimes assumed that as societies modernized, they’d become more secular, just as in Europe and parts of the United States. They’d be more driven by the desire to make money than to conquer others. They’d be more driven by the desire to settle down into suburban homes than by the fanatical ideologies or the sort of hunger for prestige and conquest that had doomed humanity to centuries of war.
在更广泛的公开对话中，有时人们认为世界各国都会钦佩西方民主国家的成功并试图模仿我们。有时人们认为，随着人们“现代化”，他们会变得更加资产阶级、消费主义、和平——就像我们一样。有时人们认为，随着社会的现代化，它们会变得更加世俗化，就像在欧洲和美国的部分地区一样。他们会更多地被赚钱的欲望所驱使，而不是征服他人。他们更倾向于在郊区定居的愿望，而不是狂热的意识形态或那种使人类注定要遭受数百年战争的声望和征服的渴望。

This was an optimistic vision of how history would evolve, a vision of progress and convergence. Unfortunately, this vision does not describe the world we live in today. The world is not converging anymore; it’s diverging. The process of globalization has slowed and, in some cases, even kicked into reverse. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlights these trends. While Ukraine’s brave fight against authoritarian aggression is an inspiration in the West, much of the world remains unmoved, even sympathetic to Vladimir Putin.
这是对历史将如何演变的乐观愿景，是对进步和融合的愿景。不幸的是，这个愿景并没有描述我们今天生活的世界。世界不再融合；这是分歧的。全球化进程已经放缓，在某些情况下甚至出现逆转。俄罗斯入侵乌克兰凸显了这些趋势。虽然乌克兰与威权侵略的英勇斗争鼓舞了西方，但世界大部分地区仍然不为所动，甚至同情黄俄の爹。

The Economist reports that between 2008 and 2019, world trade, relative to global G.D.P., fell by about five percentage points. There has been a slew of new tariffs and other barriers to trade. Immigration flows have slowed. Global flows of long-term investment fell by half between 2016 and 2019. The causes of this deglobalization are broad and deep. The 2008 financial crisis delegitimized global capitalism for many people. China has apparently demonstrated that mercantilism can be an effective economic strategy. All manner of antiglobalization movements have arisen: those of the Brexiteers, xenophobic nationalists, Trumpian populists, the antiglobalist left.
《经济学人》报告称，2008 年至 2019 年间，世界贸易相对于全球 GDP 下降了约 5 个百分点。出现了一系列新的关税和其他贸易壁垒。移民流动已经放缓。 2016 年至 2019 年，全球长期投资流量下降了一半。这种去全球化的原因是广泛而深刻的。 2008 年的金融危机使许多人失去了全球资本主义的合法性。中国显然已经证明，重商主义可以成为一种有效的经济战略。各种形式的反全球化运动已经兴起：退欧派、仇外民族主义者、特朗普民粹主义者、反全球化左派。

There’s just a lot more global conflict than there was in that brief holiday from history in the ’90s. Trade, travel and even communication across political blocs have become more morally, politically and economically fraught. Hundreds of companies have withdrawn from Russia as the West partly decouples from Putin’s war machine. Many Western consumers don’t want trade with China because of accusations of forced labor and genocide. Many Western C.E.O.s are rethinking their operations in China as the regime gets more hostile to the West and as supply chains are threatened by political uncertainty. In 2014 the United States barred the Chinese tech company Huawei from bidding on government contracts. Joe Biden has strengthened “Buy American” rules so that the U.S. government buys more stuff domestically.
与上世纪 90 年代那个短暂的历史假期相比，全球冲突现在要多得多。跨政治集团的贸易、旅行甚至交流在道德、政治和经济上都变得更加令人担忧。随着西方与黄俄の爹的战争机器部分脱钩，数百家公司已从俄罗斯撤出。由于强迫劳动和种族灭绝的指控，许多西方消费者不想与中国进行贸易。随着中共政权对西方越来越敌视，而且供应链受到政治不确定性的威胁，许多西方 CEO 正在重新考虑他们在中国的业务。 2014 年，美国禁止中国科技公司华为竞标政府合同。乔·拜登加强了“购买美国货”的规定，以便美国政府在国内购买更多的东西。

The world economy seems to be gradually decoupling into, for starters, a Western zone and a Chinese zone. Foreign direct investment flows between China and America were nearly $30 billion per year five years ago. Now they are down to $5 billion.
首先，世界经济似乎正在逐渐脱钩成一个西方区域和一个中国区域。五年前，中美之间的外国直接投资每年接近 300 亿美元。现在它们已降至 50 亿美元。

As John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge wrote in a superb essay for Bloomberg, “geopolitics is definitively moving against globalization — toward a world dominated by two or three great trading blocs.” This broader context, and especially the invasion of Ukraine, “is burying most of the basic assumptions that have underlain business thinking about the world for the past 40 years.”
正如约翰·米克尔思韦特和阿德里安·伍尔德里奇在为彭博社撰写的一篇精彩文章中所写的那样，“地缘政治正在明确地反对全球化——走向一个由两三个大贸易集团主导的世界。”这种更广泛的背景，尤其是对乌克兰的入侵，“正在掩盖过去 40 年来商业思考世界的大部分基本假设。”

Sure, globalization as flows of trade will continue. But globalization as the driving logic of world affairs — that seems to be over. Economic rivalries have now merged with political, moral and other rivalries into one global contest for dominance. Globalization has been replaced by something that looks a lot like global culture war.
当然，作为贸易流动的全球化将继续下去。但全球化作为世界事务的驱动逻辑——似乎已经结束。经济竞争现在已经与政治、道德和其他竞争合并为一场全球主导地位的竞争。全球化已经被看起来很像全球文化战争的东西所取代。

Looking back, we probably put too much emphasis on the power of material forces like economics and technology to drive human events and bring us all together. This is not the first time this has happened. In the early 20th century, Norman Angell wrote a now notorious book called “The Great Illusion” that argued that the industrialized nations of his time were too economically interdependent to go to war with one another. Instead, two world wars followed.
回顾过去，我们可能过于强调经济和技术等物质力量的力量来推动人类事件并将我们团结在一起。这不是第一次发生这种情况。 20 世纪初，诺曼·安杰尔（Norman Angell）写了一本现在臭名昭著的书，名为《大幻觉》，该书认为他那个时代的工业化国家在经济上过于相互依存，无法相互开战。相反，随后发生了两次世界大战。

The fact is that human behavior is often driven by forces much deeper than economic and political self-interest, at least as Western rationalists typically understand these things. It’s these deeper motivations that are driving events right now — and they are sending history off into wildly unpredictable directions.
事实是，人类行为往往是由比经济和政治自身利益更深层次的力量驱动的，至少西方理性主义者通常理解这些事情。正是这些更深层次的动机正在推动目前的事件——它们正在将历史推向极其不可预测的方向。

First, human beings are powerfully driven by what are known as the thymotic desires. These are the needs to be seen, respected, appreciated. If you give people the impression that they are unseen, disrespected and unappreciated, they will become enraged, resentful and vengeful. They will perceive diminishment as injustice and respond with aggressive indignation.
首先，人类受到所谓的胸腺欲望的强烈驱动。这些都是需要被看到、尊重和欣赏的。如果你给人的印象是他们看不见、不尊重和不欣赏，他们会变得愤怒、怨恨和报复。他们会认为贬值是不公正的，并以激进的愤慨来回应。

Global politics over the past few decades functioned as a massive social inequality machine. In country after country, groups of highly educated urban elites have arisen to dominate media, universities, culture and often political power. Great swaths of people feel looked down upon and ignored. In country after country, populist leaders have arisen to exploit these resentments: Donald Trump in the United States, Narendra Modi in India, Marine Le Pen in France.
在过去的几十年里，全球政治就像一台巨大的社会不平等机器。在一个又一个国家，受过高等教育的城市精英群体已经崛起，主宰媒体、大学、文化和政治权力。很多人感到被轻视和忽视。在一个又一个国家，民粹主义领导人利用这些怨恨崛起：美国的唐纳德·特朗普、印度的纳伦德拉·莫迪、法国的玛丽娜·勒庞。

Meanwhile, authoritarians like Putin and Xi Jinping practice this politics of resentment on a global scale. They treat the collective West as the global elites and declare their open revolt against it. Putin tells humiliation stories — what the West supposedly did to Russia in the 1990s. He promises a return to Russian exceptionalism and Russian glory. Russia will reclaim its starring role in world history.
与此同时，像黄俄の爹和希望这样的威权主义者在全球范围内实行这种怨恨政治。他们将集体西方视为全球精英，并宣布公开反抗它。黄俄の爹讲述了屈辱的故事——据说西方在 1990 年代对俄罗斯做了什么。他承诺回归俄罗斯的例外主义和俄罗斯的荣耀。俄罗斯将重新在世界历史上扮演主角。

China’s leaders talk about the “century of humiliation.” They complain about the way the arrogant Westerners try to impose their values on everybody else. Though China may eventually become the world’s largest economy, Xi still talks about China as a developing nation.
中国领导人谈论“百年屈辱”。他们抱怨傲慢的西方人试图将自己的价值观强加于其他人的方式。尽管中国最终可能成为世界上最大的经济体，但希望仍将中国视为发展中国家。

Second, most people have a strong loyalty to their place and to their nation. But over the past few decades many people have felt that their places have been left behind and that their national honor has been threatened. In the heyday of globalization, multilateral organizations and global corporations seemed to be eclipsing nation-states.
其次，大多数人对自己的位置和国家有着强烈的忠诚度。但在过去的几十年里，许多人感到自己的位置被抛在了后面，他们的国家荣誉受到了威胁。在全球化的鼎盛时期，多边组织和全球性公司似乎让民族国家黯然失色。

In country after country, highly nationalistic movements have arisen to insist on national sovereignty and to restore national pride: Modi in India, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, Trump in the United States, Boris Johnson in Britain. To hell with cosmopolitanism and global convergence, they say. We’re going to make our own country great again in our own way. Many globalists completely underestimated the power of nationalism to drive history.
在一个又一个国家，出现了高度民族主义的运动，以坚持国家主权并恢复民族自豪感：印度的莫迪、土耳其的雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安、美国的特朗普、英国的鲍里斯·约翰逊。他们说，世界主义和全球融合会见鬼去吧。我们将以自己的方式让我们自己的国家再次伟大。许多全球主义者完全低估了民族主义推动历史的力量。

Third, people are driven by moral longings — by their attachment to their own cultural values, by their desire to fiercely defend their values when they seem to be under assault. For the past few decades, globalization has seemed to many people to be exactly this kind of assault.
第三，人们受到道德渴望的驱使——他们对自己的文化价值观的依恋，当他们似乎受到攻击时，他们渴望强烈捍卫自己的价值观。在过去的几十年里，全球化在很多人看来正是这种攻击。

After the Cold War, Western values came to dominate the world — through our movies, music, political conversation, social media. One theory of globalization was that the world culture would converge, basically around these liberal values.
冷战后，西方价值观开始主宰世界——通过我们的电影、音乐、政治对话、社交媒体。全球化的一种理论是，世界文化将基本围绕这些自由价值观趋同。

The problem is that Western values are not the world’s values. In fact, we in the West are complete cultural outliers. In his book “The WEIRDest People in the World,” Joseph Henrich amasses hundreds of pages of data to show just how unusual Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic values are.
问题是西方价值观不是世界价值观。事实上，我们西方完全是文化异类。在他的《世界上最奇怪的人》一书中，约瑟夫·亨利奇收集了数百页的数据，以展示西方、受过教育、工业化、富裕和民主价值观是多么不寻常。

He writes: “We WEIRD people are highly individualistic, self-obsessed, control-oriented, nonconformist and analytical. We focus on ourselves — our attributes, accomplishments and aspirations — over our relationships and social roles.”
他写道：“我们 WEIRD 人是高度个人主义的、自恋的、控制导向的、不墨守成规的和善于分析的。我们专注于自己——我们的品质、成就和抱负——而不是我们的人际关系和社会角色。”

It’s completely possible to enjoy listening to Billie Eilish or Megan Thee Stallion and still find Western values foreign and maybe repellent. Many people around the world look at our ideas about gender roles and find them foreign or repellent. They look at (at our best) our fervent defense of L.G.B.T.Q. rights and find them off-putting. The idea that it’s up to each person to choose one’s own identity and values — that seems ridiculous to many. The idea that the purpose of education is to inculcate critical thinking skills so students can liberate themselves from the ideas they received from their parents and communities — that seems foolish to many.
完全有可能享受听 Billie Eilish 或 Megan Thee Stallion 的音乐，但仍然会发现西方价值观是陌生的，也许是令人厌恶的。世界各地的许多人看着我们关于性别角色的想法，发现它们是陌生的或令人厌恶的。他们（以我们最好的方式）看着我们对 L.G.B.T.Q 的狂热辩护。权利并发现它们令人反感。每个人都可以选择自己的身份和价值观的想法——这对许多人来说似乎很荒谬。教育的目的是灌输批判性思维技能，这样学生就可以从他们从父母和社区那里得到的想法中解放出来——这对许多人来说似乎是愚蠢的。

With 44 percent of American high school students reporting persistent feelings of sadness or hopelessness, our culture isn’t exactly the best advertisement for Western values right now.
有 44% 的美国高中生表示持续感到悲伤或绝望，我们的文化现在并不是西方价值观的最佳广告。

Despite the assumptions of globalization, world culture does not seem to be converging and in some cases seems to be diverging. The economists Fernando Ferreira and Joel Waldfogel studied popular music charts in 22 countries between 1960 and 2007. They found that people are biased toward the music of their own country and that this bias has increased since the late 1990s. People don’t want to blend into a homogeneous global culture; they want to preserve their own kind.
尽管有全球化的假设，但世界文化似乎并未趋同，在某些情况下似乎正在分化。经济学家费尔南多·费雷拉（Fernando Ferreira）和乔尔·沃尔德福格尔（Joel Waldfogel）研究了 1960 年至 2007 年间 22 个国家的流行音乐排行榜。他们发现人们对自己国家的音乐有偏见，而且这种偏见自 1990 年代后期以来有所增加。人们不想融入同质的全球文化；他们想保留自己的同类。

Every few years the World Values Survey questions people from around the globe about their moral and cultural beliefs. Every few years, some of these survey results are synthesized into a map that shows how the different cultural zones stand in relation to one another. In 1996 the Protestant Europe cultural zone and the English-Speaking zone were clumped in with the other global zones. Western values were different from the values found in say, Latin America or the Confucian zone, but they were contiguous.
每隔几年，世界价值观调查就会向世界各地的人们询问他们的道德和文化信仰。每隔几年，这些调查结果中的一些会被综合成一张地图，显示不同文化区域之间的关系。 1996 年，欧洲新教文化区和英语区与其他全球区聚集在一起。西方价值观与拉丁美洲或儒家地区的价值观不同，但它们是连续的。

But the 2020 map looks different. The Protestant Europe and English-Speaking zones have drifted away from the rest of the world cultures and now jut out like some extraneous cultural peninsula.
但 2020 年的地图看起来有所不同。新教欧洲和英语区已经远离世界其他文化，现在像一些无关紧要的文化半岛一样突出。

 

In a summary of the surveys’ findings and insights, the World Values Survey Association noted that on issues like marriage, family, gender and sexual orientation, “there has been a growing divergence between the prevailing values in low-income countries and high-income countries.” We in the West have long been outliers; now our distance from the rest of the world is growing vast.
世界价值观调查协会在总结调查结果和见解时指出，在婚姻、家庭、性别和性取向等问题上，“低收入国家和高收入国家的主流价值观之间的分歧越来越大。国家。”我们西方长期以来一直是异类。现在，我们与世界其他地方的距离越来越远。

Finally, people are powerfully driven by a desire for order. Nothing is worse than chaos and anarchy. These cultural changes, and the often simultaneous breakdown of effective governance, can feel like social chaos, like anarchy, leading people to seek order at all costs.
最后，人们强烈地被对秩序的渴望所驱使。没有什么比混乱和无政府状态更糟糕的了。这些文化变化，以及经常同时出现的有效治理崩溃，让人感觉像是社会混乱、无政府状态，导致人们不惜一切代价寻求秩序。

We in the democratic nations of the world are lucky enough to live in societies that have rules-based orders, in which individual rights are protected and in which we get to choose our own leaders. In more and more parts of the world, though, people do not have access to this kind of order.
我们世界上的民主国家很幸运，生活在以规则为基础的秩序的社会中，个人权利受到保护，我们可以选择自己的领导人。然而，在世界越来越多的地方，人们无法获得这种秩序。

Just as there are signs that the world is economically and culturally diverging, there are signs it is politically diverging. In its “Freedom in the World 2022” report, Freedom House notes that the world has experienced 16 consecutive years of democratic decline. It reported last year: “The countries experiencing deterioration outnumbered those with improvements by the largest margin recorded since the negative trend began in 2006. The long democratic recession is deepening.” This is not what we thought would happen in the golden age of globalization.
正如有迹象表明世界在经济和文化上存在分歧一样，也有迹象表明世界在政治上存在分歧。自由之家在其“2022 年世界自由”报告中指出，世界已经连续 16 年经历了民主衰退。它去年报道说：“自 2006 年开始出现负面趋势以来，经历恶化的国家数量超过了改善的国家。长期的民主衰退正在加深。”这不是我们认为在全球化黄金时代会发生的事情。

In that heyday, democracies appeared stable, and authoritarian regimes appeared to be headed to the ash heap of history. Today, many democracies appear less stable than they did and many authoritarian regimes appear more stable. American democracy, for example, has slid toward polarization and dysfunction. Meanwhile, China has shown that highly centralized nations can be just as technologically advanced as the West. Modern authoritarian nations now have technologies that allow them to exercise pervasive control of their citizens in ways that were unimaginable decades ago.
在那个全盛时期，民主政体看似稳定，威权政体似乎正走向历史的灰烬。今天，许多民主国家似乎不如以前那么稳定，而许多威权政权似乎更稳定。例如，美国民主已经滑向两极分化和功能失调。与此同时，中国已经表明，高度集权的国家在技术上可以与西方一样先进。现代威权国家现在拥有的技术使他们能够以几十年前无法想象的方式对其公民进行普遍控制。

Autocratic regimes are now serious economic rivals to the West. They account for 60 percent of patent applications. In 2020, the governments and businesses in these countries invested $9 trillion in things like machinery, equipment and infrastructure, while democratic nations invested $12 trillion. If things are going well, authoritarian governments can enjoy surprising popular support.
专制政权现在是西方的严重经济竞争对手。它们占专利申请的 60%。 2020年，这些国家的政府和企业在机械、设备和基础设施等方面投资了9万亿美元，而民主国家则投资了12万亿美元。如果事情进展顺利，威权政府可以得到惊人的民众支持。

What I’m describing is a divergence on an array of fronts. As scholars Heather Berry, Mauro F. Guillén and Arun S. Hendi reported in a study of international convergence, “Over the last half century, nation-states in the global system have not evolved significantly closer (or more similar) to one another along a number of dimensions.” We in the West subscribe to a series of universal values about freedom, democracy and personal dignity. The problem is that these universal values are not universally accepted and seem to be getting less so.
我所描述的是一系列方面的分歧。正如学者 Heather Berry、Mauro F. Guillén 和 Arun S. Hendi 在一项关于国际趋同的研究中所报告的那样，“在过去的半个世纪里，全球体系中的民族国家并没有显着地相互接近（或更相似）”。多个维度。”我们西方赞同一系列关于自由、民主和个人尊严的普世价值。问题是这些普世价值并没有被普遍接受，而且似乎越来越少。

Next, I’m describing a world in which divergence turns into conflict, especially as great powers compete for resources and dominance. China and Russia clearly want to establish regional zones that they dominate. Some of this is the kind of conflict that historically exists between opposing political systems, similar to what we saw during the Cold War. This is the global struggle between the forces of authoritarianism and the forces of democratization. Illiberal regimes are building closer alliances with one another. They are investing more in one another’s economies. At the other end, democratic governments are building closer alliances with one another. The walls are going up. Korea was the first major battleground of the Cold War. Ukraine could the first battleground in what turns out to be a long struggle between diametrically opposed political systems.
接下来，我将描述一个分歧变成冲突的世界，尤其是在大国争夺资源和主导地位的情况下。中国和俄罗斯显然希望建立他们主导的区域。其中一些是历史上存在于对立政治体系之间的冲突，类似于我们在冷战期间看到的冲突。这是威权主义力量与民主化力量之间的全球斗争。非自由主义政权正在相互建立更密切的联盟。他们正在对彼此的经济进行更多投资。另一方面，民主政府正在相互建立更紧密的联盟。墙壁正在上升。朝鲜是冷战的第一个主要战场。乌克兰可能成为完全对立的政治制度之间长期斗争的第一个战场。

But something bigger is happening today that is different from the great power struggles of the past, that is different from the Cold War. This is not just a political or an economic conflict. It’s a conflict about politics, economics, culture, status, psychology, morality and religion all at once. More specifically, it’s a rejection of Western ways of doing things by hundreds of millions of people along a wide array of fronts.
但今天正在发生更大的事情，这与过去的大国斗争不同，与冷战不同。这不仅仅是一场政治或经济冲突。这是一场关于政治、经济、文化、地位、心理、道德和宗教的冲突。更具体地说，它是数以亿计的人在各个方面拒绝西方的做事方式。

To define this conflict most generously, I’d say it’s the difference between the West’s emphasis on personal dignity and much of the rest of the world’s emphasis on communal cohesion. But that’s not all that’s going on here. What’s important is the way these longstanding and normal cultural differences are being whipped up by autocrats who want to expand their power and sow chaos in the democratic world. Authoritarian rulers now routinely weaponize cultural differences, religious tensions and status resentments to mobilize supporters, attract allies and expand their own power. This is cultural difference transmogrified by status resentment into culture war.
为了最宽泛地定义这场冲突，我想说这是西方对个人尊严的强调与世界其他大部分地区对社区凝聚力的强调之间的区别。但这并不是这里发生的全部。重要的是这些长期存在的正常文化差异是由那些想要扩大自己的权力并在民主世界播下混乱的独裁者所激起的。威权统治者现在经常将文化差异、宗教紧张局势和地位怨恨作为武器，以动员支持者、吸引盟友并扩大自己的权力。这是由地位怨恨转化为文化战争的文化差异。

Some people have revived Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory to capture what’s going on. Huntington was right that ideas, psychology and values drive history as much as material interests. But these divides don’t break down on the neat civilizational lines that Huntington described.
有些人复兴了塞缪尔·亨廷顿的文明冲突理论，以捕捉正在发生的事情。亨廷顿说得对，思想、心理和价值观对历史的推动作用与物质利益一样重要。但这些分歧并没有打破亨廷顿描述的整洁的文明路线。

In fact, what haunts me most is that this rejection of Western liberalism, individualism, pluralism, gender equality and all the rest is not only happening between nations but also within nations. The status resentment against Western cultural, economic and political elites that flows from the mouths of illiberal leaders like Putin and Modi and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil sounds quite a lot like the status resentment that flows from the mouths of the Trumpian right, from the French right, from the Italian and Hungarian right.
事实上，最困扰我的是，这种对西方自由主义、个人主义、多元化、性别平等等一切的拒绝不仅发生在国家之间，也发生在国家内部。从黄俄の爹、莫迪和巴西的贾尔博尔索纳罗等非自由主义领导人的口中对西方文化、经济和政治精英的地位不满，听起来很像从特朗普右翼、法国右翼的口中流出的地位不满。 ，来自意大利和匈牙利的权利。

There’s a lot of complexity here — the Trumpians obviously have no love for China — but sometimes when I look at world affairs I see a giant, global maximalist version of America’s familiar contest between Reds and Blues. In America we’ve divided along regional, educational, religious, cultural, generational and urban/rural lines, and now the world is fragmenting in ways that often seem to mimic our own. The paths various populists prefer may differ, and their nationalistic passions often conflict, but what they’re revolting against is often the same thing.
这里有很多复杂性——特朗普人显然不爱中国——但有时当我审视世界事务时，我会看到一个巨大的、全球最大化版本的美国熟悉的红军和蓝军之间的较量。在美国，我们按照地区、教育、宗教、文化、代际和城市/农村划分，现在世界正在以似乎经常模仿我们自己的方式分裂。不同的民粹主义者喜欢的道路可能不同，他们的民族主义激情经常发生冲突，但他们反抗的往往是同一件事。

How do you win a global culture war in which differing views on secularism and gay rights parades are intertwined with nuclear weapons, global trade flows, status resentments, toxic masculinity and authoritarian power grabs? That’s the bind we find ourselves in today.
你如何赢得一场全球文化战争，在这场战争中，对世俗主义和同性恋权利游行的不同看法与核武器、全球贸易流动、地位怨恨、有毒的男子气概和专制权力攫取交织在一起？这就是我们今天发现的束缚。

I look back over the past few decades of social thinking with understanding. I was too young to really experience the tension of the Cold War, but it must have been brutal. I understand why so many people, when the Soviet Union fell, grabbed onto a vision of the future that promised an end to existential conflict.
回顾过去几十年的社会思考，我深有体会。我还太小，无法真正体验冷战的紧张，但那一定是残酷的。我理解为什么有这么多人在苏联解体时抓住了一个承诺结束存在冲突的未来愿景。

I look at the current situation with humility. The critiques that so many people are making about the West, and about American culture — for being too individualistic, too materialistic, too condescending — these critiques are not wrong. We have a lot of work to do if we are going to be socially strong enough to stand up to the challenges that are coming over the next several years, if we are going to persuade people in all those swing countries across Africa, Latin America and the rest of the world that they should throw their lot in with the democracies and not with the authoritarians — that our way of life is the better way of life.
我谦虚地看待现在的情况。这么多人对西方和美国文化的批评——过于个人主义、过于物质主义、过于居高临下——这些批评并没有错。如果我们要在社会上强大到足以应对未来几年即将到来的挑战，如果我们要说服非洲、拉丁美洲和拉丁美洲所有摇摆不定的国家的人们，我们还有很多工作要做。世界其他地方，他们应该投身于民主国家而不是独裁者——我们的生活方式是更好的生活方式。

And I look at the current situation with confidence. Ultimately, people want to stand out and fit in. They want to feel that their lives have dignity, that they are respected for who they are. They also want to feel membership in moral communities. Right now, many people feel disrespected by the West. They are casting their lot with authoritarian leaders who speak to their resentments and their national pride. But those leaders don’t actually recognize them. For those authoritarians — from Trump to Putin — their followers are just instruments in their own search for self-aggrandizement.
我满怀信心地看待目前的情况。归根结底，人们想要脱颖而出并融入其中。他们想要感到自己的生活有尊严，想要因自己的身份而受到尊重。他们还想感受道德社区的成员身份。现在，很多人都觉得西方不尊重。他们正在与专制领导人交涉，这些领导人表达了他们的怨恨和民族自豪感。但这些领导人实际上并不认识他们。对于那些威权主义者——从特朗普到黄俄の爹——他们的追随者只是他们寻求自我扩张的工具。

At the end of the day, only democracy and liberalism are based on respect for the dignity of each person. At the end of the day, only these systems and our worldviews offer the highest fulfillment for the drives and desires I’ve tried to describe here.
归根结底，只有民主和自由主义是建立在尊重每个人的尊严的基础上的。归根结底，只有这些系统和我们的世界观才能最大程度地满足我在这里试图描述的驱动力和欲望。

I’ve lost confidence in our ability to predict where history is headed and in the idea that as nations “modernize” they develop along some predictable line. I guess it’s time to open our minds up to the possibility that the future may be very different from anything we expected.
我对我们预测历史走向的能力以及随着国家“现代化”它们沿着某些可预测的路线发展的想法失去了信心。我想是时候让我们敞开心扉接受未来可能与我们预期的任何事情大不相同的可能性了。

The Chinese seem very confident that our coalition against Putin will fall apart. Western consumers won’t be able to tolerate the economic sacrifice. Our alliances will fragment. The Chinese also seem convinced that they will bury our decadent systems before too long. These are not possibilities that can be dismissed out of hand.
中国人似乎非常有信心，我们反对黄俄の爹的联盟将会分崩离析。西方消费者将无法忍受经济上的牺牲。我们的联盟将分裂。中国人似乎也相信他们很快就会埋葬我们腐朽的制度。这些都不是可以一蹴而就的可能性。

But I have faith in the ideas and the moral systems that we have inherited. What we call “the West” is not an ethnic designation or an elitist country club. The heroes of Ukraine are showing that at its best, it is a moral accomplishment, and unlike its rivals, it aspires to extend dignity, human rights and self-determination to all. That’s worth reforming and working on and defending and sharing in the decades ahead.
但我对我们继承的思想和道德体系充满信心。我们所说的“西方”不是种族名称或精英乡村俱乐部。乌克兰的英雄们表明，在最好的情况下，这是一种道德成就，与竞争对手不同，它渴望将尊严、人权和自决权扩大到所有人。在未来的几十年里，这值得改革、努力、捍卫和分享。

标红字体均为楼主更改，与原文作者无关。[/b]

坚决支持清零政策[/b]

 

1024

厉害国，一直文化自信，然后就没有然后了

总的来说，包子上台，好事没有，坏事做绝

感谢分享 全球化结束多亏了包子的功劳，只不过富豪 权贵移民走了  只剩下韭菜了

感谢分享

1024

思想和文化的整合

乌克兰信奉那套普世价值观，国内有钱人都跑了
剩下穷人在被美分的鹅爹炮击

感谢分享

感谢分享

离文明越来越远，屁民还不如蝼蚁，可悲的是愚民还是大多数，哎

感谢分享

1024

1024

加速翻译

感谢分享

感谢分享

谢谢聚聚分享

感谢分享

政治全球化

还是看谁拳头大

过去，现在，将来都不会有社会主义，更别说共产主义了。这两个词都是马克思恩格斯这两个二货忽悠人的。

多谢分享

1024