[2022-08-22] 经济学人 - 中国经济毫无出路
![]() No way out
China’s economy is beset by problems. The zero-covid policy is just one
毫无出路
中国经济面临诸多问题。 动态清零政策只是其中一项
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WHEN SHANGHAI lifted its two-month lockdown in June, it hoped to see citizens flocking back to the shops in relief. Instead it has witnessed people fleeing a store in alarm. On August 13th health authorities discovered that a close contact of a child infected with covid-19 had visited an IKEA outlet in the city. Under Shanghai’s strict virus-control regulations, the store had to be immediately locked down, so that everyone inside could be whisked off to quarantine. But panicked shoppers rushed for the exits, pushing past guards.
当上海在 6 月解除为期两个月的封锁时，政府希望看到市民如释重负地涌回商店。 相反，它目睹了人们惊慌地逃离商店。 8 月 13 日，卫生当局发现一名感染武汉肺炎的儿童的密切接触者曾到访该市的宜家商场。 根据上海严格的病毒防控规定，必须立即封锁该商店，以便将里面的每个人都带到隔离区。 但惊慌失措的购物者冲向出口，推开了警卫。
Similar perils face anyone in China bold enough to take a holiday. As many as 150,000 tourists have been stranded on the resort island of Hainan, where a covid outbreak has infected over 13,000 people this month. Those hoping to leave have faced onerous testing requirements (pictured) and widespread flight cancellations. Videos circulating online show families sleeping on the floor of an airport.
在中国，任何敢于度假的人都面临着类似的危险。 多达 150,000 名游客被困在度假胜地海南岛，本月爆发的武汉肺炎疫情已感染了 13,000 多人。 那些希望离开的人面临着繁重的测试要求和广泛的航班取消。 网上流传的视频显示，一家人睡在机场的地板上。
China’s zero-covid policy has left its economy equally trapped. The impact is both direct and indirect, hampering both supply and sentiment.
中国的动态清零政策使其经济同样陷入困境。 这种影响既有直接的，也有间接的，阻碍了供应和情绪。
The most profound effects are not always the most obvious. Hainan, for example, accounts for only 5% of China’s tourism revenues, according to Tao Chuan and Shao Xiang of Soochow Securities, a broker. Tourism as a whole accounts for only 4% of China’s GDP. Lockdowns elsewhere in the country have been relatively short in recent weeks. Despite great alarm about disrupted global supply chains, China’s exports have continued to grow strongly. On a visit to a port in the export hub of Shenzhen, Li Keqiang, the prime minister, likened the country’s reforms and the port’s achievements to an irreversible river.
最深刻的影响并不总是最明显的。 例如，据券商东吴证券的陶川和邵翔称，海南仅占中国旅游收入的 5%。 旅游业整体仅占中国GDP的4%。 最近几周，该国其他地方的封锁相对较短。 尽管对全球供应链中断感到非常担忧，但中国的出口继续强劲增长。 在访问深圳出口枢纽的港口时，总理李克强将国家的改革和港口的成就比作一条不可逆转的河流。
Given the drought now afflicting six of China’s provinces, it was perhaps an unfortunate metaphor. But Mr Li’s pep talk was at least tacit acknowledgment of the damage China’s covid-crushing measures have done to morale. For every trapped shopper or tourist, there are thousands of others who will not shop, travel or spend to avoid a similar fate. Consumer confidence in the second quarter was the lowest on record. As a result, China’s consumption has lagged behind industry and exports. Retail sales in July were only 2.7% higher than a year ago. When adjusted for inflation, they shrank.
鉴于目前中国六个省份遭受旱灾，这可能是一个不幸的比喻。 但李克强的振奋人心的讲话至少是默认了中国的武汉肺炎打击措施对士气造成的损害。 对于每一个被困的购物者或游客，影响着成千上万的人不会购物、旅行或消费以避免类似的命运。 第二季度消费者信心创历史新低。 因此，中国的消费落后于工业和出口。 7 月份的零售额仅比一年前高出 2.7%。 经通胀调整后，它们出现了萎缩。
Sales of furniture have been particularly weak—and not just because people dare not enter IKEA. Buying furniture is closely tied to home purchases, which have plunged. Sales of residential property fell by over 28% in July, compared with a year earlier. Weak sales have in turn put downward pressure on prices.
家具销售特别疲软——不仅仅是因为人们不敢进入宜家。 购买家具与房屋购买密切相关，后者已经暴跌。 与去年同期相比，7 月份住宅物业的销售额下降了 28% 以上。 销售疲软反过来又给价格带来下行压力。
To cap it all, people who buy a flat in advance can no longer be sure it will actually be built. Many distressed developers lack the cash required to complete construction and can no longer find anyone to lend it to them. That has contributed to long delays in finishing pre-sold properties, prompting a growing number of buyers to threaten to stop repaying their mortgages.
总而言之，提前购买公寓的人不能再确定它会真正建成。 许多陷入困境的开发商缺乏完成建设所需的现金，再也找不到人借钱给他们。 这导致完成预售物业的时间很长，促使越来越多的买家威胁要停止偿还抵押贷款。
The accumulation of bad economic data has finally prompted the central bank to act. It reduced two interest rates by 0.1 percentage points on August 15th, bucking the global trend towards tighter monetary policy. But these cuts may not be effective, because demand for loans is so weak. Since April China’s money supply (broadly measured) has been growing faster than its broad stock of credit. This has not happened since 2015, according to Jiang Peishan and Sun Liping of Haitong Securities, another broker. It suggests an eagerness to hoard money rather than borrow it. “Funds are idling,” they argue. That raises fears of a liquidity trap, whereby monetary policy becomes ineffective in reviving growth.
不良经济数据的积累终于促使央行采取行动。 8月15日两次降息0.1个百分点，逆势全球收紧货币政策。 但这些削减可能不会奏效，因为对贷款的需求如此疲软。 自 4 月以来，中国的货币供应量（广义）的增长速度一直快于其广义的信贷存量。 另一位券商海通证券的姜培山和孙立平表示，这种情况自 2015 年以来就没有发生过。 这表明人们渴望囤积而不是借钱。 “资金处于闲置状态，”他们争辩道。 这引发了对流动性陷阱的担忧，即货币政策在恢复增长方面变得无效。
If monetary policy is losing its bite, the onus falls more firmly on fiscal policy to rescue China’s economy. Investment in infrastructure is already growing quickly. But the central government has yet to step in decisively to revive the property market. It has told China Bond Issuance, a state-owned credit insurer, to underwrite bond sales by a handful of private property developers, including a unit of Longfor Group. There is also talk of a 300bn-yuan ($44bn) rescue fund. But so far the central government has been largely content to let cash-strapped local governments cobble together rescue plans on their own.
如果货币政策正在失去作用，那么拯救中国经济的财政政策的责任就会更加坚定。 基础设施投资已经快速增长。 但中央政府尚未果断介入以重振房地产市场。 它已要求国有信用保险公司中国发债承销少数私营房地产开发商的债券销售，其中包括龙湖集团的一个子公司。 也有传言要设立 3000 亿元人民币（440 亿美元）的救助基金。 但到目前为止，中央政府基本上满足于让资金拮据的地方政府自行制定救援计划。
What explains its diffidence? The cost of finishing stalled projects is large but calculable. Andrew Batson of Gavekal Dragonomics, a research firm, has put it in the range of 2trn-4.8trn yuan, or 1.8-4.2% of last year’s GDP. A full restoration of confidence might, however, require something closer to a “blanket guarantee” that all pre-sold properties would be built, says Houze Song of Macropolo, a think-tank. That would be an “open-ended commitment”, which could come at an “exorbitant cost”.
是什么解释了它的冷漠？ 完成停滞项目的成本很大，但可以计算。 研究公司 Gavekal Dragonomics 的 Andrew Batson 将其估计在 2万亿-4.8万亿元之间，即去年 GDP 的 1.8-4.2%。 然而，智库 Macropolo 的 Houze Song 表示，要完全恢复信心可能需要更接近“一揽子保证”的东西，即所有预售物业都将建成。 这将是一个“没有保障的承诺”，可能会付出“高昂的代价”。
Such a guarantee could also skew incentives. Mr Song compares it with deposit insurance. One difference is that deposit insurance discourages bank runs, thereby reducing the risk it insures. A backstop for pre-sales, by contrast, might have the opposite effect. It could make it more likely that property developers will run into trouble, especially if it allowed reckless operators to pre-sell flats more easily.
这样的保证也可能会扭曲激励措施。 宋先生把它比作存款保险。 一个区别是存款保险阻止了银行挤兑，从而降低了它所保险的风险。 相比之下，预售的支持可能会产生相反的效果。 它可能使房地产开发商更有可能遇到麻烦，特别是如果它允许鲁莽的经营者更容易地预售公寓。
The commitment to zero-covid and to ending China’s housing excesses comes from the top. Both goals have been repeatedly emphasised by Xi Jinping, China’s leader, whose personal philosophy, Xi Jinping Thought, looms over everything. But as he prepares to secure a third term at a Communist Party congress later this year, those iron commitments have left the economy in a jam. The economic setting for the congress is not what Xi Jinping thought it would be. Nor is it anything Xi Jinping Thought appears able to solve.
对动态清零和结束中国住房过剩的承诺来自高层。 中国领导人希望一再强调这两个目标，他的个人哲学“希望思想”笼罩着一切。 但当他准备在今年晚些时候的20大上获得第三个任期时，这些铁的承诺让经济陷入困境。 20大的经济环境并非希望所想的那样。 希望思想似乎也解决不了任何问题。标红字体均为楼主更改，与原文作者无关。![]() 好多人一直在强调要按照规矩翻译COVID-19，我按照规矩翻译的话，也太长了吧。
C - China - 中国
O - Outbreak - 爆发
V - Virus - 病毒
I - In - 在
D - December - 12月
19 - 2019 - 2019年
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